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In the old days radicals of virtually all hues knew exactly what they
thought about the law: It was a tool of the ruling class. Not a subtle
theory, but at least until the 1930's and the New Deal it seemed to ex-
plain much of what courts and legislatures did and said. And since the
chief occupation of radical lawyers until that time was to keep leftists and
union activists out of jail, the theory also seemed adequate to their experi-
ence. Law was merely a part of capitalism's "superstructure," an epiphe-
nomenon governed by what happened in the "base," the real world of
production and economic life. Out of struggle and contradictions within
the base, revolutionary change would inevitably occur, and the old super-
structure would be toppled. Law, therefore, did not warrant serious theo-
retical scrutiny.
This orthodox Marxist framework has lost its prophetic value, and its
explanatory power has grown remarkably thin. For today's radical law-
yers-who do a great many things besides trying to keep people out of
jail-the received leftist notions about law generate fruitless doubts and
few insights. But a renewal of radical thinking about law is afoot. The
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, founded in 1976, embraces a loose-
knit school of radical legal academics and lawyer-writers devoted to giving
law the kind of intellectual attention that traditional leftist thought denies
it.
The Politics of Law' provides a sampling of the school's initial efforts
f Acting Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
1. THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited by
page number only].
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and an occasion for a tentative assessment of its promise. This anthology
of sixteen essays is addressed to a wide variety of readers, both activists
and scholars. One must ask, then, whether the book's various approaches
to law promise to illuminate the experience of legal activists and inform
their actions more reliably than the inherited stock of radical ideas. And
one must also ask how far Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has progressed in
developing an alternative framework for studying the interplay of law,
politics, and society.
I.
CLS actually springs from two intellectual traditions, one indigenous to
the legal academy, the other foreign. The first is Legal Realism, which
bequeathed to CLS scholars its characteristic methods of assailing the
classical premise that legal rules, doctrines, and principles can yield deter-
minate results. The second tradition is that of unorthodox, independent, or
"neo"-Marxism, which, since the 1920's, has embraced a variety of at-
tempts by European thinkers to reconstruct the orthodox Marxist frame-
work by recovering the anti-positivist, Hegelian strains of Marx's thought
and by appropriating the insights of other great social theorists like Max
Weber.' This tradition has lent CLS a perspective that most practitioners
dub "critique," a term meant to signify a theoretical vantage point outside
both the legal order and the larger intellectual and social universe in
which that order is embedded. By adopting such a "totalizing" perspec-
tive,' CLS seeks to show that our ways of organizing and understanding
the social world, which seem natural and inevitable from within that uni-
verse, are nothing but what Blake called "mind-forg'd manacles" when
seen from without.
The chief manacle is liberalism-not New Deal politics, but the world
view associated with Hobbes, Locke, Smith, and the framers of the Amer-
ican Constitution. "Liberal legalism" is the subsidiary manacle at which
CLS aims its blows.4 Like classical liberal thought generally, "liberal le-
2. THE UNKNOWN DIMENSION: EUROPEAN MARXISM SINCE LENIN (D. Howard & K. Klare eds.
1972) is a useful collection of essays on the twentieth-century Marxists invoked by CLS scholars:
Lukics, Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, and Sartre. On Lukics' and the Frankfurt School's engage-
ment with Weber, see D. HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS
(1980).
3. The seminal definition and example of "totalizing critique" for CLS can be found in R.
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975). In the collection under review, Karl Klare provides a
definition and usage more characteristic of the authors represented in the volume and of tbe neo-
Marxian strand of CLS. See pp. 65-67.
4. See R. UNGER, supra note 3, at 63-100; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783-84 (1983); Kennedy, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1979); Klare, Judicial Deradical-
ization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 265, 276-77 (1979); Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done (Book Review), 96
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galism" begins with congeries of atomistic individuals. Somehow, prior to
the formation of society, each individual "naturally" has her own private
values, goals, and property (at least in her person and capacity to labor).
Each is also capable of reason. Reason, however, cannot adjudicate be-
tween competing ends or values; they are subjective, arbitrary matters of
will and desire. The basic problem for liberal political thought is the
Hobbesian one of organizing society and the polity so as to protect each
individual in her person and property-in her "rights"-from other po-
tentially stronger individuals. The basic solution is the social contract and
the rule of law. The individuals agree to found a state and abide by its
laws, and the rule of law thus instituted protects individuals and their
property as they set about collaborating and clashing in the pursuit of
private ends.
In this manner, liberal political thought divides the social world into a
"public" and a "private" realm. Within the private realm, individuals are
"autonomous" and relations "voluntary." It is the realm of "freedom";
public intervention is "coercive." Liberalism also separates "law" and
"politics." Politics, which is ruled by will, consists of clashing, irremedia-
bly subjective interests and conceptions of the common good. Law stands
above and apart from politics and is governed by reason. That is why the
rule of law can hold out its dual promise of mediating between the public
sovereign and private rightholders and among rightholders themselves.
And that is why liberal legalism comes to rest on the assurance that when
courts say what the law means, their judgments are based on a distinctive
and objective method unsullied by the values and interests-the poli-
tics-of those who judge.5
Legal Realism is commonly thought to have unhinged this assurance.
Realism attacked the prevailing dogmas of rule formalism and conceptual-
ism, contending that, under the cloak of conceptualism's "mechanical ju-
risprudence," the courts were in fact making value or policy judgments.
The problem, as the Realists saw it, was that these judgments were not
merely concealed but also at odds with an enlightened view of the "public
interest." The Realists envisioned a new purposive and fact-sensitive style
HARV. L. REV. 1466, 1466-67 (1983) (reviewing THE POLITIcS OF LAW (D. Kairys ed. 1982)).
5. Such is the dominant CLS synopsis of "liberal legalism." It is accurate as far as it goes, but,
even as a portrait of basic assumptions, it is somewhat static and ahistorical. It rightly highlights the
classical bourgeois or possessive individualist, marketplace conception of rights. But it risks trivializing
the inner tensions and transformations and the radical, potentials engendered within liberal political
thought over the past two centuries by liberalism's commitment to the ideals of human liberty and
equality. Compare the very different, though also Marxian-inspired, account of liberalism in Baker,
The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 304
(1981) (emphasizing liberalism's "contradictory oppressive and liberating impulses"). See C.B. MAC-
PHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 3-76, 143-203 (1973); Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 602 (1983); infra p. 1049.
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of legal reasoning. The ersatz objectivity of the past would be supplanted
by the genuine objectivity of judicial and administrative policymaking in-
formed by the social sciences.'
While CLS scholars insist that the "logic" of the Realist assault leaves
liberal legalism in shambles, they concede that the Realists' aims were
narrower.7 The mind-forged manacle absorbed Realism, repaired itself by
loosening certain joints, and survived more or less intact. CLS scholars
have undertaken to carry on the Realists' internal attack on liberal legal
discourse, employing Realism's analytic techniques at ever higher levels of
generality. Their object is to demonstrate that the indeterminacy, incoher-
ence, and contradictions that Realists exposed in particular doctrinal fields
pervade the whole legal framework, its basic images of society, and all its
new, as well as old, claims to "objectivity." 8
At this point, the neorealist strand of CLS joins the neo-Marxian and
social theoretical strand. Internal criticism gives way to a critique of law
as it is said to figure in social life. The key words are "ideology" and
"legitimation," and the endeavor is to describe and explain how the lib-
eral legal order "enforces, reflects, constitutes, and legitimizes"9 hierarchy
and domination of men over women, whites over blacks, and capital over
labor.
Roughly speaking, the first part of The Politics of Law is taken up
with neorealism, while the second and third reflect what the Frankfurt
School (the originator of "critical theory") called "ideologiecritik." 10 The
essays are uneven; a few apply the newly adopted concepts in a wooden
fashion, others do so with great insight. The new emphasis on law as
ideology, rather than as a mere instrument, is welcome. But the particular
conception of law as ideology that runs almost throughout the book tends
to portray law as a Satanic mill churning out nothing but snares, illu-
sions, and false consciousness. This kind of negative critique can be de-
fended as a corrective to the legal academy's complacency and to law's
vast powers of mystification. Nonetheless, it falsifies the more complex
ways legal ideology actually figures in consciousness and society. And this
6. See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); Ayer, In Quest of Elfidency:
The Ideological Journey of Thurman Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1971);
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 459 (1979); White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972).
7. See, e.g., pp. 26-29; Klare, Book Review, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876, 878-81 (1979) (reviewing C.
KNAPP, CONTRACT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE FIRST-YEAR CASEBOOK (1976)); Tushnet, Post-Realist
Legal Scholarship, 15 J. SOC'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 20 (1980).
8. See Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Schol-
arship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1680 (1982).
9. P. 5.
10. See M. JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1923-1950 (1973).
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form of critique leads paradoxically to a radical theory withdrawn from
the politics of law, not engaged in them.
To do justice to CLS's best insights and aspirations, the neo-Marxian
legacy needs to be severely reassessed and not merely adopted. Certain of
that legacy's central ideas, which several contributors here have embraced,
seem to be both flawed theoretical tools and the source of bootless confu-
sion about law's part in imagining and struggling for the good society.
Reassessment may begin with the dilemmas that this pioneering book
casts up. But, coming to grips with them may require forsaking an apoca-
lyptic, Blakean view of liberal legalism for a more historical one.
II.
The three neorealist contributions to The Politics of Law reflect the
achievements and the shortcomings of that strand of CLS. The achieve-
ments are most evident in Elizabeth Mensch's shrewd and brilliantly con-
densed History of Mainstream Legal Thought." Mensch's narrative
turns on the insight that one can recover certain key features of successive
eras of legal thought by examining their strategies for maintaining the
separation of law and politics. Since Realism helped inspire this kind of
historical "deconstruction," it is no surprise that Mensch offers an appre-
ciative and cogent account of that school. More intriguing is her detached
admiration for "classical legal consciousness," the reigning mode of legal
thought from the 1880's through the mid-1930's, and the Realists' neme-
sis. According to Mensch, classical thought "produced a grandly inte-
grated conceptual scheme that seemed, for a fleeting moment in history, to
bring coherence to the whole structure of American law, and to liberal
political theory in general."'1 2 Mensch chides those who today cite "classi-
cal" cases like Adair's and Coppage'4 "as representing a judiciary deter-
mined to impose its own economic biases on the country," for such a char-
acterization "trivializes the underlying power of the classical conceptual
scheme." 5
The motive behind this reevaluation seems fairly clear. The classical
scheme represents the classical expression of liberal legalism. Trivializing
the scheme also "trivializes the importance of the realist assault that re-
vealed its incoherence," and glosses over the fact that the "basic model"
bequeathed by the classics is "with us still."' 6 The "post-realist Recon-
11. P. 18.
12. P. 23.
13. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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struction," which spans the 1940's to the present, has salvaged the "bank-
rupt form" of liberal legalism in large part by
simply conceding a number of key realist insights and then attempt-
ing to incorporate those insights into an otherwise intact doctrinal
structure. What were once perceived as deep and unsettling logical
flaws have been translated into the strengths of a progressive legal
system. For example, the indeterminacy of rules has become the flex-
ibility required for sensible, policy-oriented decision-making; and the
collapse of rights into contradiction has been recast as "competing
interests," which are inevitable in a complex, tragic world and which
obviously require an enlightened judicial balancing. In other words,
we justify as legal sophistication what the classics would have viewed
as the obvious abandonment of legality.17
I do not dispute the descriptive accuracy or the rhetorical force of this
passage. I am concerned with the historical judgment implicit in it and
throughout Mensch's account of the "Reconstruction" enterprise. In good
neorealist style, Mensch has adopted the viewpoint of the clas-
sics-particularly the touchstone of formal rationality-to indict the
moderns. But her strategy fails to register that much was gained by "what
the classics would have viewed as the . ..abandonment of legality."
Classical legal thought purchased its intellectual power at the cost of being
dogmatic and arrogantly individualistic in a classical nineteenth-century
bourgeois manner. As I have noted, its central dogma lay in the putative
naturalness and freedom of the "private" sphere of market and property
(as well as racial and gender) relations.' The grand formalist style of
reasoning that accompanied these ideas was wedded to them as form is
wedded to content. By "incorporating" Realism, Reconstruction ushered
in a new style of reasoning that is more or less divorced from this highly
confining dogma. Contemporary "legal consciousness" concedes that its
reasons and norms-even its definitions of "public" and "pri-
vate"-require justification in terms of explicit social and political consid-
erations. "Policy-oriented decisionmaking" confesses the public political
nature of legal discourse and, to that extent, always carries an implicit
warrant for its democratization.
Even in its "incorporated" form, then, Realism has undermined the
wall between legal doctrinal argument and social and political debate.
Mensch suggests that incorporation stripped Realism of all its subversive
force. But her own observations-and those of other CLS scholars-on
17. P. 29.
18. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
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the indeterminacy and potential reaches of postrealist doctrine refute her.
It has become possible to carry remarkably radical ideas and arguments
across the border the classics patrolled so much more effectively. Recon-
struction opened new vistas for mystification and apologetics, but it also
created new openings for those who choose to contest the inequities of the
social and political order within-as well as outside-legal discourse.
The two other essays in Part One of this collection suggest another
radical turn of the Realist screw. David Kairys' Legal Reasoning ' 9 is a
lucid, though somewhat familiar, debunking of the classical claim that for-
mal reasoning from precedent determines the path of law. Kairys shows
the manipulability and indeterminacy of precedent and the way judges'
social and political values inevitably figure in legal determinations.
"Law," Kairys concludes, "is simply politics by other means."'
Duncan Kennedy's Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy1 is a
brilliant polemic on law school culture. While Kairys has rehearsed the
Realist critique of formal legal reasoning, Kennedy, in his discussion of
the legal curriculum, carries the critique forward into the realm of con-
temporary legal thinking, where formal reasoning is always assisted by,
and juxtaposed with, the kinds of purposive, policy-oriented reasoning
that the Realists championed.2 In a flamboyant style, Kennedy sets out
the conclusions of his several carefully argued studies of this modern dis-
course.13 Policy analysis seeks to import neutral, social scientific criteria
like "efficiency" to undergird particular regimes of legal rules and secure
for them a measure of objectivity. Kennedy has demonstrated that such
criteria are no less indeterminate or manipulable than precedent; they can
support the most widely disparate rules and results.2 Likewise, for every
social purpose that can be said to define the metes and bounds of a partic-
ular doctrine, there exists a contrary but equally plausible purpose that
alters the doctrine's boundaries.25 Thus, neither formal logic, policy, nor
purposive analysis can produce a legal reasoning shorn of substantive




22. See p. 33; Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563
(1982).
23. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 22; Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90
YALE L.J. 1275 (1981); Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 711 (1980); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976).
24. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 23; Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitima-
tion, supra note 23.
25. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, supra note 23; Kennedy,
supra note 22.
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nonsense when they persuade students that legal reasoning is distinct, as a
method for reaching correct results, from ethical and political discourse in
general.""8
There is a further step in this internal critique of liberal legalism which
Kairys and Kennedy only intimate. As it stands, the critique turns on the
liberal definitions of law as the realm of objectivity and reason, and polit-
ics as the realm of clashing and arbitrary subjective values and interests.
When Kairys declares that "law is simply politics by other means," he
risks upholding contemporary liberalism's impoverished notions of reason
and politics. Given CLS's aim of opposing hierarchy and domination with
democratic community, it seems wise to hold the rule of law to its partial-
ity for reason. Rather than simply disparaging the liberal legal scheme's
claim to adjudicate social disputes by way of reason and damning law
(and politics) as the unvarnished exercise of arbitrary will, perhaps CLS
should assail the assumption that reason's claims are exhausted by formal
and policy rationality.
Neither formal nor policy rationality can objectively decide the social
issues that inevitably arise in litigation, because the social world does not
have the natural, determinate character that liberal legalism projects upon
it. The social arrangements that legal discourse and judgments affirm or
deny require rational vindication, but they will not yield to the logical
coercion of formal rationality, nor to the positive coercion of "science" that
policy analysis claims to offer. The legal process must render reasoned
adjudications between competing political perspectives, and no transcen-
dent criteria of truth and falsity exist against which to measure such
claims. There is rather what Hannah Arendt calls the "supremely politi-
cal faculty of judgment," a capacity for "representative thinking," taking
into account different standpoints.2 7 This faculty has its own form of ra-
tionality, which Aristotle called "practical reason"2' 8  and Jilrgen
Habermas dubs "intersubjective rationality."2' 9 This form of rational vin-
dication is inherently democratic; its rationality is vouchsafed by un-
dominated intersubjective agreement or consent.30
The next step of internal criticism-where liberalism yields up an as-
pect of its radical potential-might be this: Law legitimates itself by ap-
peal to reason, and yet the reigning modes of legal rationality deliver a
26. P. 47.
27. See Arendt, Truth and Politics, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 115 (P. Laslett &
W.G. Runciman eds. 1967).
28. See Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 221-40
(A. Rorty ed. 1980).
29. See J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 102-13 (1975); Habermas, Hannah Arendt's Com-
munications Concept of Power, 44 SOC. RESEARCH 3 (1977).
30. Habermas, supra note 29.
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kind of "objectivity" that is largely sham-and inevitably so. By its own
normative lights, the legal order-and the social and economic arrange-
ments it envelops and ratifies-requires a kind of radical democratic re-
construction: a warrening with public spaces of participation so that law
fully partakes of the form of rationality that befits it.
This radical reconstructive route is pursued by Roberto Unger in his
splendid essay, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 1 published some
time after The Politics of Law. Unger contends that the neorealist critique
of purposive reasoning has disclosed the extent to which contemporary
legal discourse already contains "conflicting tendencies" suggesting "alter-
native schemes of human association."'32 He echoes Kennedy when he ar-
gues that legal reagoning cannot legitimately lay claim to a rationality
"other than the minimal but perhaps still significant potential rationality
of the normal modes of moral and political controversy. "" But unlike
Kennedy or Kairys, Unger goes on to argue that this "looser form" of
rationality can nevertheless support a distinctively legal mode and tradi-
tion of disputing over the conduct of human affairs. However, the recogni-
tion that legal rationality is not distinctive in the ways convention still
claims for it demands that "the class of legitimate doctrinal activities must
be sharply enlarged."34 Doctrinal debate, in other words, cannot dogmati-
cally stop short of the "broader contests among prescriptive conceptions of
society" already implicit in it. 5 And, by the same token, legal institutions
ought to be transformed to accommodate disputes over the power struc-
tures and social hierarchies that constitute the taken-for-granted back-
grounds of current legal and political culture.3"
There is no space here for a separate and full consideration of Unger's
lengthy effort to lend the neorealist critique a "constructive outcome" and
CLS in general a dimension of "prescriptive and programmatic thought."
For present purposes, this summary of Unger's essay suffices to confirm
and amplify my initial suggestion. Pressed far enough, the neorealist ar-
gument may make legal reasoning yield a case for radical reconstruction.
That case is implicit in Kairys' and Kennedy's essays, but the neorealist
31. Unger, supra note 5.
32. Id. at 567-69.
33. Id. at 579.
34. Id. at 577.
35. Id. at 578.
36. Thus according to Unger, the "constructive outcome" of the neorealist critique lies in a new
conception of law and its relation to social life. Unger calls this conception "empowered democracy"
or "superliberalism," and he sets out in imaginative detail the kind of institutional reconstruction, the
new "branches of government," the new forms and arenas of legal contest and participation, and the
new kinds of rights which comport with this revised conception of law. At the same time, he defends
his program of institutional reconstruction by appealing to liberal and democratic norms available
within contemporary legal discourse, rendering the imaginative exercise itself an illustration of "ex-
panded doctrine" and "internal development."
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and neo-Marxian strands of their arguments, and indeed of the collection
as a whole, converge before the case for reconstruction can unfold.
Conspicuously absent from the collection are any sustained normative
or programmatic arguments.3 If the contributors were old-fashioned
Marxists, convinced that the "iron laws" of history were preparing the
inevitable revolution, the omission might be no surprise. But they are not,
and-given radical lawyers' inescapable engagements with the claims of
reason and justice and those of practice (in both its broad and narrower
sense)-the omission of such arguments is surprising and troubling. The
reason for it, as I have indicated, may lie in certain fairly new-fashioned,
New Left notions about law's part in social life.
Kairys' debunking of legal reasoning is animated by the belief that the
"myth of legal reasoning" plays a significant role in enlisting people's
consent to "existing social and power relations.""8 Likewise, Kennedy im-
pugns "liberal rights theory" as a species of false consciousness, and sev-
eral other authors organize their critiques around the role of law in legiti-
mating domination and hierarchy. 9 I share the view that law serves a
"hegemonic" role, but I am skeptical about whether it does so in quite the
fashion that Kairys and other contributors suggest. First, I question
whether people in general believe that the judicial process is apolitical and
governed by reason. As Edward Thompson has remarked about English
law, people "will not be mystified by the first man [or woman] who puts
on a wig."40 People are committed to the "rule of law," but for reasons
that will be unshaken by showing them the indeterminacy of rules and
precedents or the contradictoriness of liberal rights. They are committed
to it because they believe, for sound historical reasons, that the rule of law
imposes certain essential constraints on power. Nor are people without a
sense of the pitfalls of liberal legalism. They know that law also protects
arbitrary power, and their "consent" to the rule of law does not automati-
cally extend to the disparities of power and wealth which law also envel-
ops and sustains. Respecting many of these disparities, I think it more
often true than not that poor and working people "submit but do not
agree. 1 14 In sum, popular consciousness about law is, perhaps, contradic-
tory-and in ways that may not be incompatible with the view that cer-
tain key aspects of the liberal order ought to be abolished, while others
37. An exception is Richard Abel's essay on torts, pp. 185-200, which attempts to imagine and
defend several alternative schemes.
38. P. 5.
39. P. 43 (Kennedy); p. 96 (Freeman); p. 172 (Gabel & Feinman); p. 294 (Polan).
40. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 262 (1975).
41. Alan Hyde develops a similar point at greater length and depth in an article that appeared
after this Review was written. Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983
WIS. L. REV. 379.
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ought to be preserved and extended.42 The authors here occasionally ges-
ture toward the positive achievements of liberal legalism and liberal de-
mocracy but seem reluctant to develop their critical enterprise accordingly.
The neorealist strand tirelessly unveils the formal contradictions of liberal
legalism, but it appears wedded to a social theory that is not much inter-
ested in exploring with equal care the contradictory-good and bad,
emancipatory and oppressive-features of law considered as a social and
political phenomenon.
III.
This social theory rests on the notion that law's role in consciousness
and society is unavoidably one of "reification" and "false consciousness."
It springs from a current of Marxist thought that inspired much of the
best theoretical work of the New Left in the 1960's and 1970's. And its
gist is that advanced capitalism has produced a "totally administered" and
"completely reified" society. In such a society, thinkers like Herbert Mar-
cuse taught the New Left, all apparent forms of opposition-and particu-
larly elass conflict-serve only to "reproduce" the existing order. Through
corporate and governmental bureaucracies, contemporary society has ab-
sorbed the class struggle and rendered it functional.43
What is worse, opposition is not only administered from without, it is
also deadened from within. "Reification" is meant to capture the es-
tranged nature of lived experience or consciousness under contemporary
capitalism. Marx's workers encountered their productive relations and ac-
tivities as alien things in the form of commodities and capital. Today, all
our relations and activities find expression in reified form; therefore, ours
is a culture without potential for genuine political opposition and
change.44
42. See infra p. 1056; J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 146-83 (1983).
43. See H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964).
44. The concept of reification originates with Georg Lukics and his interpretation of Marx. See
G. LUK CS, Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat, in HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUS-
NESS 83-222 (1971). The Frankfurt School-particularly Adorno, Horkheimer and Mar-
cuse-adopted Lukics' notion of reification, but relinquished the orthodox conviction that the indus-
trial working classes were destined to become the collective historical "subjects" who would usher in
revolution. For them, "reification" became an explanation for the extinction of genuine "subjectivity,"
a theoretical description of a society wherein the springs of radical aspirations-from the labor move-
ment and popular imagination to art and philosophy-have all been frozen by technical rationality,
administration, and the "commodity form." See, e.g., T. ADORNO & M. HORKHEIMER, DIALECTIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT (1973); T. ADORNO, Cultural Criticism and Society, in PRISMS 19-34 (1967); H.
MARCUSE, supra note 43. Habermas, the leading contemporary exponent of critical theory, rejects this
image of the present as a totally reified world in which radical theory can maintain its integrity only
by restricting itself to a negative dialectic and critique. He finds the liberating potential of the present,
ironically enough, in the "claim to reason" and democratic process announced in the liberal legal
order, but suppressed by the "power constellations" of contemporary capitalism. See Habermas, A
Reply to My Critics, in J. HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES 221 (D. Held & J. Thompson eds. 1982).
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This deeply pessimistic brand of Marxism has inspired outstanding cul-
tural criticism. As a guide to politics and practice, it is precisely what
Adorno, its greatest thinker, called it: a "philosophy of despair." It is not
surprising, then, that this philosophy has encouraged, or confirmed, a des-
perate confusion and ambivalence about the role of law in social change or
in the good society.
Marxism's functionalist strain, which Marcuse popularized, informs
Alan Freeman's essay in this collection. He concludes that the "function"
of civil rights law is to "reproduce" and "legitimate" the "existing class
structure. '4 5 This mechanical conclusion does not follow from Freeman's
sensitive analysis of the law. Having lit on it, however, he seems recently
to have drawn a more general conclusion which is also an echo of "critical
theory." To engage in "legal argument and ideology," whatever one's con-
scious purpose, is inevitably to reproduce the status quo. Therefore, he
argues, only "negative, critical activity"-only "delegitimating" or "trash-
ing" existing legal discourse and scholarship-can reveal "the path to a
liberated future. '46 The role law may play on the path or afterwards re-
mains obscure.
How does Freeman arrive at his conclusions about the "functional" na-
ture of civil rights law? His critical account of the trajectory of civil rights
doctrine from Brown to the present is lucid and penetrating. After an
initial "Era of Uncertainty" when the law was "preoccupied . . . with
extending the scope of antidiscrimination law" and avoided the problem of
remedies, Supreme Court doctrine passed into an "Era of Contradic-
tion."4  In the latter era, the Court formally hewed to traditional legal
notions of fault, causation, and a close, logical link between right and
remedy, but actually it began to modify all of these notions. It began halt-
ingly to adopt what Freeman calls "the victim perspective"-one which
attends to results, remedying present racially oppressive conditions, even
when the link between those conditions and a discrete, provable discrimi-
natory act is attenuated. Finally, the Court retreated from this perspective
into an "Era of Rationalization." It reasserted the primacy of the tradi-
tional notions that previously it had begun to subvert and thereby consoli-
dated civil rights law as a rationalization for the "continued presence of
racial discrimination in our society."'48
According to Freeman, this evolution was no "mere accident resulting
from the fortuitous appointment of the Burger Court." We fail to under-
45. P. 106.
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stand the inner nature of civil rights law if we think that the "adverse
decisions . . . just as easily could have gone the other way." Rather, the
"jurisprudence of rationalization" arose because "needs basic to the pres-
ervation of the class structure" are somehow embedded in the law, and
these "compelled the rejection of the victim perspective. '
Freeman's judgment that the chief effect of civil rights law since Brown
has been to legitimate pre-existing racial and social hierarchies strikes me
as somewhat simplistic and ahistorical. 5° Even if one assumes he is right,
however, Freeman explains little when he associates this effect with an
imputed "need" of capitalist society and then contends that the law has
evolved as it has because its functional "role" is to meet this "need." 51
Freeman asserts that "deep structural" imperatives within legal ideology
rendered the "adverse decisions" inevitable, but his reading of the doctri-
nal evolution makes clear that the legal ideology involved was malleable
enough to support a quite different evolution. Nothing that Freeman
points to within the ideology "compels" the "jurisprudence of rationaliza-
tion." This jurisprudence seems rather the contingent product of a partic-
ular political climate and balance of social forces.
Of course, Freeman is right that the remedial schemes inspired by the
"victim perspective" prompted dislocations, apprehensions, and resent-
ment among working class whites. But no deep-seated internal dynamic
preordained the law's response. The response arose, in the first instance,
because the judges who shaped the law, like the President who appointed
them, were disposed to identify with-and exploit-that resentment in a
particular fashion.52 The traditional individualistic categories of legal dis-
49. P. 111. The "needs" Freeman cites are three-fold: (1) "the problem of formal equality,"
which ensures that lower class whites bear the brunt of any dislocation arising from ambitious reme-
dial schemes; (2) the fact that a focus on oppressive "conditions rather than conduct, and on society
rather than individuals, threatens the legitimacy of vested rights"; and (3) the fact that such a focus
undermines the "myth of equality of opportunity." Pp. 111-12. Freeman notes that "equality of op-
portunity" is an ideological mainstay of the class structure and its social inequalities. The notions of
merit and objective qualifications for jobs are, in turn, key aspects of the "'system' of equality of
opportunity." P. 113. Since Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which Freeman regards
as the central and most radical case of the "Era of Contradiction," pp. 104, 112, raised the specter of
wholesale legal scrutiny of job testing, it threatened to subvert the "system" by revealing that such
tests are generally "either irrational or meaningless." P. 107. In other words, Griggs and the victim
perspective in general eroded the legitimacy of the class structure. The law responded, as it "had to,"
by rejecting that perspective.
50. Such a judgment slights the profound ("delegitimating") effects which the abolition of legal
segregation had on pre-existing racial hierarchies and power relations. It also discounts the ways civil
rights law and litigation legitimated broadly based protest and political mobilization on the part of
poor black communities. Of course, Freeman's critique of the ways Supreme Court doctrine truncates
the social-historical causes and effects of racial domination is not incompatible with these observations.
But they do suggest that his historical assessment of "civil rights law" as an ideology abroad in the
culture is abstract and one-sided.
51. See A. GIDDENS, STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 96-129 (1977) (criticizing func-
tionalism as form of explanation in social theory); Hyde, supra note 41 (same).
52. The "jurisprudence of rationalization" may be the legal counterpart of what Gary Wills has
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course made it easy to articulate the rejection of the victim perspective in
the language of legal, and liberal, common sense, but inferring inevitabil-
ity from ease is rash. Freeman's rashness leads to the devastating conclu-
sion that radical legal activists and scholars must disavow the discourse of
civil rights, lest they contribute to the law's "legitimation function."
Once one extricates Freeman's analysis from its ill-suited functionalist
framework, a different conclusion seems possible. The emergence of the
"victim perspective" illustrates the possibility of an equal protection juris-
prudence that engages the actualities of racial oppression. Freeman rightly
identifies those other elements of liberal and legal ideology that impede
the development of such a jurisprudence, both in popular consciousness
and official discourse. To be sure, these notions of formal equality and
vested rights lend legitimacy to the class structure, but that does not some-
how immunize them from what Unger calls internal transformation. 53
Such a jurisprudence might demonstrate that the very notions that im-
pede the radicalization of equal protection doctrine and help translate
black workers' legal gains into white workers' losses also stand as obsta-
cles to a more truly democratic labor law." The implications of a radical-
ized equal protection jurisprudence might lead to the conclusion that only
some sort of participatory socialist polity would provide an institutional
framework adequate to doing justice to the legitimate claims of all par-
ties.55 This may be what Freeman means when he says that "no genuine
liberation or change in the conditions associated with the historical prac-
tice of racial discrimination can be accomplished without confronting class
structure." But discerning the ways class domination finds support in
law must be but a first step.
Freeman should not leave us with the bald injunction to confront class
inequality, as though the "class structure" were a concrete fortress that
true opponents of inequality could simply dismantle if they were not dis-
tracted by the liberal chatter of civil rights. To confront the class structure
is to engage the manifold institutions and ideologies wherein class rela-
tionships are molded and reproduced, but also contested and modified.
Law is one site of these processes. As this society's central normative dis-
course, law lends legitimacy to inequality, but it does so by dint of its
claims to universal equality and fairness and because it registers the strug-
called the "politics of resentment." See G. WILLS, NIXON AGONISTES 61-75 (1970).
53. See, e.g., Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black
Poor, 61 OP. L. REV. 201 (1982); Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of
Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599 (1979).
54. See Kare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspec.
tives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157 (1982).
55. See Unger, supra note 5, at 602-16.
56. P. 97.
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gles of dominated groups at the same time that it blunts them. Only by
attending to this contradictory process can one begin to account for the
ideological contradictions and indeterminacies that enabled the "victim
perspective" to emerge in the first place. And by virtue of these qualities,
Freeman might continue to elaborate a radical equal protection jurispru-
dence that confronts class structure at the level of normative discourse.Y
Instead, Freeman's functionalist bias leads him to abandon the terrain of
legal-ideological controversy where his and other CLS scholars' contribu-
tions are sorely needed.
If Freeman leaves one confused about what part law may play in over-
coming inequality and building the good society, Peter Gabel is more
forthcoming. In a number of essays, including the one he co-authored for
this volume, Gabel has developed the notion that law is a "reified" form
of communication." To clothe a person in legal forms is to impose on her
a self transformed or "alienated" into a "thing-like function of the 'sys-
tem.' "" Gabel's response is to dispense with law and cease talking about
justice and human needs "in abstract legal terms." 60 Since capitalist pro-
duction gives rise to "alienation," and since law is "only a recast form" of
"underlying socio-economic relations," we must focus instead on the pro-
duction process to create "the possible conditions for a concrete justice."61
Gabel has introduced valuable new perspectives into CLS, 2 but certain
key formulations of his law-as-reification thesis seem disconcertingly fa-
miliar. The idea that talking about justice "in legal terms" is a kind of
false necessity imposed by capitalism ultimately rests on the conviction
that in the good society-one with transformed relations of production--
government will become nothing more than the technical "administration
of things."6 3 In this view, the state-and therefore, talk of law and
rights-exists only because in a class-based society government means rul-
ing over people."
In other words, the argument for "junking" law turns on the treacher-
ous notion that one can rigorously distinguish administering things from
governing or ruling people. This notion might have seemed plausible in
57. See Calmore, supra note 53.
58. See p. 172; Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RESEARCH L. & SOC. 25 (1980); Gabel,
Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method for Critical Legal Theory, 61
MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977); Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARv. L. REV. 302 (1977) (reviewing R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)).
59. Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, supra note 58, at 28.
60. Gabel, Book Review, supra note 58, at 309.
61. P. 176.
62. See Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982-1983).
63. See Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MARXISM 78 (A.
Mendel ed. 1961).
64. S. AVINERI, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT OF KARL MARX 17-40 (1968).
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the nineteenth century, but our subsequent experience suggests that all
structures of "merely technical" or "economic" administration are also
power structures."' Thus, it is folly today to believe that even the good
society, with its democratic relations of production, would require merely
the "administration of things" to coordinate its affairs. This belief as-
sumes that all the various purportedly technical decisions entailed by "ad-
ministration" would enlist everyone's spontaneous consent. Once we ac-
knowledge that power over people inevitably inheres in such decisions, we
must add that the good society would require not merely a framework for
coordinating its economic affairs, but also a means to contest and revise
that framework's organization, procedures, and results.
Even in the sphere of economic relations, the good society would there-
fore need institutions much like law-making and adjudication. Having
conceded that "administration" entails power structures, we must also
confront the problem of legitimating power. Means for contest and revi-
sion, while necessary, are not sufficient. Legitimate power arises only
from consent, and consent of the active sort that this radical, democratic
scheme obviously entails is generated only by citizens participating in a
vital, public, political sphere."" So, the good society would need measures
to secure a sphere or, rather, many "spaces" throughout the society for
free and undominated political involvement and deliberation.
- Moreover, having enlarged the public realm of participation to embrace
productive and economic affairs as well as other now remote decision-
making, the good society would also need to secure the private spaces that
protect individuals from coerced "involvement" and, thereby, make free-
dom authentic. It would need to provide what Unger has called "immu-
nity rights,' 67 including those traditional "liberal rights," which ensure
personal freedom from external, state, or collective coercion.
Thus, the good society, though grounded in "transformed relations of
production," may contain many things that look suspiciously like
"law"-not only activities that resemble "legislating" and "adjudication,"
but also a variety of measures that can only be called "rights." Perhaps
then, not all "rights talk" is reducible to an estranged, reified individual-
ism in the manner that Gabel, Kennedy, and others often suggest."6
65. See J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY 50-61, 81-122 (1970).
66. See supra note 29.
67. See Unger, supra note 5, at 599-600.
68. For example, those rights associated with political liberty and those which are inscribed in
labor legislation to protect "concerted activities" have historical roots in republican, not liberal, tradi-
tion. They do not represent some cultural or legal encoding of society's self-estrangement under capi-
talism. Rather, they arise from the historical experience of collective struggles for self-determination
against various forms of social and political domination. It seems absurd, therefore, to demand that
this kind of "rights talk" be "dereified" before it can enter radical theory or culture. See Kennedy,
Critical Labor Law Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 503, 506 (1981).
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The most compelling aspect of Marxist thought surely lies in its claim
to identify the seeds of a possible and better future in the social forms,
relations, and conflicts of the present. Yet, as we have seen, it is just that
aspect of the Marxian legacy-its emphasis on the "dialectical" and "con-
tradictory" qualities of social phenomena like law -- that CLS's "reifica-
tion" and "legitimation function" theses seem to lack. This theoretical,
and political, deficit also helps to explain why these approaches cannot
seem to capture the Janus-faced character of legal ideology as it actually
figures in social life. Gabel and Feinman, for example, in their essay on
Contract Law as Ideology point out that contract law in the nineteenth
century "generated a new ideological imagery" of free and equal individu-
als whose reciprocal obligations in economic life arose from wholly volun-
tary exchanges.70 They rightly underscore the "utopian content" of this
imagery, but' they assume that its sole effect was to "conceal" and "deny"
the market's oppressive character and working people's "lack of real per-
sonal liberty."71 Ideological matters are never so one-sided; legal "hege-
mony" would rarely succeed if they were.
In fact, working people seized on the voluntaristic basis of nineteenth-
century contract law to assert and later defend the right to strike. The
very emergence of the labor movement hinged on workers' compelling the
legal order and the state to abide by contract ideology. In the 1880's and
1890's when the corporate bar and the courts fashioned the labor injunc-
tion to curtail the power workers enjoyed by dint of their not entirely
illusory contractual freedom, workers, again, invoked contract ideology to
justify defiance.72 This reliance on "liberal legalism" did not prevent
many of the same workers from discovering in the "utopian content" of
contract law the basis for a critique of wage labor and capital. If the only
legitimate form of economic enterprise rested on consensual agreements
between freestanding citizens-so the major Gilded Age labor organiza-
In fairness to Kennedy, I should add that while he frequently cites Lukics and declares that "rights
talk" is "reified," he nonetheless rejects the classic premises of the social theory underlying the idea of
reification. When Lukics-or Gabel-says that law is reification he means that the various dilemmas
of "individual" versus "society" and "freedom" versus "order" that liberal legal thought and doctrine
seek to mediate are historically contingent in a specific sense. The dilemmas seem eternal but are
really artifacts of capitalism. His rejection of "rights talk" notwithstanding, Kennedy clearly seems to
think these dilemmas may be less contingent (or intractable in even more complex ways) than the
present mode of production. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 211-13, 220-21.
69. For a valuable discussion, see Spitzer, The Dialectics of Formal and Informal Control, in
THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 167-205 (R. Abel ed. 1982); Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the




72. E.g., Injunctions Unrespected, 4 AM. FEDERATIONIST 159 (1897); Shades of Jeffries, 1 AM.
FEDERATIONIST 12 (1894); 1 AM. FEDERATIONIST 234 (1894) (letter to editor); see J. FREY, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION (1923); S. GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR 244-50 (1925).
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tions like the Knights of Labor reasoned-then "no genuine freedom of
contract" could exist "under the wage labor system."7 The nineteenth-
century labor movement's radical goal of a "Co-operative Common-
wealth" of worker-owned industries was a counter-hegemonic vision built
largely out of the utopian material of contract ideology.74 Legal ideology
penetrates popular consciousness in more complex ways than Feinman
and Gabel allow, and both its doctrinal premises, like marketplace free-
dom, and its "utopian content," like "liberty" and "equality," sometimes
secure real material and ideological advantages for subordinate groups.
One does not come to grips with the "ideological power of the law" unless
one also explores these moments of advantage and their reaches and
limitations.
Three other historical essays in this collection take different approaches
to the interplay of law and social experience. Nadine Taub and Elizabeth
Schneider's Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Rule of
Law"3 charts two centuries of women's social and legal history. Unlike
most of the other essays, theirs concerns the ways law shapes the material
world as well as the world of beliefs and ideology. In contrast to Gabel
and Feinman, they convey a sense of how the ideological subordination of
women in the nineteenth century was bound up with certain tangible his-
torical gains associated with the emergence of "separate sphere" ideology.
Finally, Taub and Schneider stand alone among the CLS scholars repre-
sented here in their emphasis that theory must respond to the interroga-
tion of empirical evidence and must sometimes remain incomplete histori-
cal inquiry.
David Kairys' useful historical and analytic essay, Freedom of
Speech,"' reminds readers that, until the 1920's, neither federal nor state
courts recognized the right of free speech. Cranks, dissenters, abolitionists,
anarchists, trade unionists, and socialists spoke and gathered publicly only
at the sufferance of government authorities or in defiance of them. Courts
offered no protection. Kairys addresses the question 6f how and why free
speech law was transformed. He provides an engaging account of the
Wobblies' "free speech fights" and illustrates well how the right to free-
dom of speech and assembly became fused with the demand of the labor
movement to be free to organize without state and court backed repres-
sion. Out of this fusion, which actually occurred over several decades be-
73. G. McNEILL, THE LABOR PROBLEM TODAY 459 (1887); see L. FINK, WORKINGMEN'S DE.
MOCRACY: THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS 3-37 (1983); W. Forbath, The Ambi-
guities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age (1983) (unpublished paper on file with
author).
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ginning in the 1880's, the First Amendment acquired an insistent popular
constituency, and the wisdom of accommodating this constituency pressed
on the political perceptions and consciences of the judiciary.77
Finally, Morton Horwitz's essay on the nineteenth-century private law
doctrine of "objective causation" is a finely textured and theoretically in-
formed example of left legal history. Horwitz shows how this doctrine
stood at the center of "late nineteenth-century efforts to construct a system
of private law free from the dangers of redistribution." 8 He examines the
"politics of causation" and the social context of doctrine but, at the same
time, provides an illustration of "the relative autonomy of legal ideas."179
The essay's account of the doctrine's demise is a brief but insightful ren-
dering of how vast social changes like the emergence of corporate capital-
ism register in the disparate intellectual worlds of science and law, erod-
ing old categories of thought and prompting new ones.
In light of these thoughtful melds of historical research and theoretical
construction, it is disconcerting to find the suggestion in Robert Gordon's
extremely useful and provocative contribution-New Developments in
Legal Theory-that CLS would do well to dispense with the whole enter-
prise of trying to understand law and legal change in terms of "large-scale
theories of historical interrelations between states, societies and econo-
mies." 80 Gordon's answer to the determinism that mars some of his co-
horts' initial attempts at this enterprise is to declare that there are no
determining relationships at all between law and social and economic
structures. There is nothing useful to be learned by thinking about law in
terms of such jumbo "positivist" notions as "class" or the "development of
capitalism."
Interestingly, Gordon, like Gabel, relies on the concept of "reification"
to underpin his methodological precepts. The nub of Gordon's argument
is that what we think of as "society" and "economy" are merely "belief-
systems that people have externalized and allowed to rule their lives."81
Like "law," these are "reifications" that constrain people unable to recog-
nize them as their own creations. So it follows, according to Gordon, that
a theory or history that aims at understanding the ostensibly constraining
relations between social structure and various human activities such as
law is part of the problem and not the solution. The solution is to look
"somewhere quite different-in the smallest . . . most ordinary interac-
77. For an insightful examination of why judicial recognition of First Amendment speech rights
began in 1918 and not earlier, see Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amendment: 1918-1928,
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tions of daily life in which some human beings dominate others and they
acquiesce in such domination."8 In fact, downtrodden people often have a
keen practical knowledge of the supposedly opaque, reified process
wherein the interactions of everyday life reproduce domination. This
knowledge makes for moments of resistance and negotiation; it does not
enable them to make the world anew. Precious few of the everyday
world's instances of domination and acquiescence are not bound up with
certain rather "large scale" and structured asymmetries of power.83
Gordon is persuasive in his criticism of positivist social science of both
liberal and Marxist hues, and eloquent in defending the view that the
social world is created or "constructed." But, by itself, that insight will
not suffice. Gordon seems to ignore the fact that one can examine struc-
tures like class, the economy, or the state and the ways they impose real
constraints on people without assuming that their histories resemble a
"natural" evolution or an "inevitable" process closed to human interven-
tion." All of us could be much more fully subject-like participants in the
"continuous recreation" of the social world if we did intervene in those
structures. And such intervention would be helped by the most careful
scrutiny and conceptualization of the object-like, coercive operations of so-
ciety as it is and law's complex part in these operations.
IV.
The essay in this collection with the richest conceptual scheme is surely
Karl Klare's admirable Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law. 5
Klare offers a framework for exploring the interplay of law and class
structure without reducing the former to a "function" or a "recast form"
of the latter. He begins instead by pointing out the obvious inadequacy of
such formulations-always true but patent in the area of labor relations,
where law so clearly contributes to "making American capitalism what it
is," rather than merely "reflecting" or "recasting" it. Klare roundly criti-
cizes the kinds of leftist history and theory that seek to explain the con-
tours of labor law in terms of the "needs of capital." Since its inception
with the Wagner Act, the modem law of collective bargaining has been
"imbued" by workers' collective efforts with "enduring democratic val-
ues." To treat it merely as an instrument of capitalist domination is one-
sided and wrongheaded."6
In certain contexts, Klare emphasizes, the law is vigilant in protecting
82. Id.
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workers' rights. In other ways, however, the law suppresses workers'
"self-activity" in favor of bureaucratized, administrative means of
"processing" workers' grievances. The law also insulates management
decisionmaking and command in the workplace by making these the quid
pro quo of the collective agreement. Taken as a whole, collective bargain-
ing law, by Klare's lights, embodies a very sophisticated but highly confin-
ing conception of "industrial democracy," a "powerfully integrated set of
beliefs, values, and . . . liberal political assumptions," which the labor
movement "or at least much of its leadership" has internalized.87 As a
result, labor has embraced a notion of "what is possible and desirable in
the workplace that stands as a barrier to industrial freedom." 88
Telling people that they have a "false consciousness" of "what is possi-
ble" can be enormously liberating, as Robert Gordon's essay eloquently
concludes, but only if done with a firm grip on the historical actualities of
their situation and a genuine and sympathetic knowledge of their aspira-
tions. Reading this essay, one cannot question Klare's sympathy, and I do
not doubt that he is familiar with working class history and experience.
But by concentrating so strictly on the "inner logic" of liberal collective
bargaining, Klare's approach discounts certain facts about that history and
experience that make his invocation of false consciousness seem somewhat
dogmatic.
Kare dubs the collective bargaining agreement "the legal form by
which organized employees consent to their own domination in the work-
place."89 At the same time, he suggests that this consent is never real in
the sense that the true collective nature of organized workers inheres in
their rank and file militancy-which is hoodwinked into such consent.
With respect to this characterization, two things seem worth noting. First,
from the late 1940's through the 1960's, when the "mature" collective
bargaining contract evolved, the productivity and profits of the organized
sector were expanding. The bulk of organized workers, not merely their
leaders, probably understood that they were choosing to pursue what had
been, until then, unattainable forms of job security and welfare benefits in
exchange for not pressing further on management's "right" to run the
enterprise." Second, it is misleading to suggest that the "legal form" of
the collective agreement necessarily frustrates workers' aspirations to exer-
cise control over the workplace. It is also somewhat whimsical to imply
that "direct action" is always a preferable way to assert and defend work-




90. See D. BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERIcA 173-214 (1980).
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sions regulating production norms, job boundaries, and the introduction of
new work methods according to their will. Most organized workers, un-
derstandably, are not averse to contractual rules per se. The critical issue,
in terms of their aspirations, may be not the legal form of collective agree-
ments as such, but shop-floor control over grievance procedures and the
negotiation of work norms.
I do not imagine that Klare would necessarily disagree with these re-
marks. They are intended to illustrate the shortcomings of a radical theory
that remains fixed on the discourse of labor law. Klare calls for a "radical
nonliberal conception of workplace democracy," to be developed "in con-
crete terms that are related . . . to the actual problems, institutions, and
emerging contradictions of industrial life.""1 To gain such concreteness,
Klare's theoretical project must engage the ways labor law actually inter-
sects with contemporary workers' struggles and concerns.
A turn toward more concrete, immediate issues would generate practi-
cal insights, but that is not the only reason it seems essential. Klare ac-
knowledges that his critique of the repressive "inner logic" of labor law
draws much of its theoretical inspiration from an inherited vision of free-
dom that is simply "inadequate." 2 Rightly chastened by the hideous bu-
reaucratic oppression that has afflicted socialist regimes, this "anti-statist"
socialist vision spurns all "institutional arrangements for organized deci-
sion making."9 " A critique of labor law animated by this vision risks de-
nouncing contemporary trade unionism and collective bargaining as "bu-
reaucratic domination" without pausing over what Klare calls the
"emancipatory strands" within these institutions. Klare stops well short of
such a denunciation, but so far he has only underscored the need to pro-
ceed in a different and uncharted direction.
Here the practical impulse to connect with immediate issues merges
with a theoretical need. Klare's ideal of workplace democracy surely does
correspond to actual initiatives on the shop floor and within many unions.
These range from union efforts to assert a measure of workers' and com-
munity control over capital investment and disinvestment, to insurgent
campaigns to democratize union hierarchies, to the pervasive and chronic
shop-floor militancy over work norms that disturbs corporate executives
and many union officials alike. These initiatives reflect the aspirations
Klare's theory seeks to nurture. In his words, they "prefigure" genuine
industrial democracy. But none of them could exist without unions, collec-
tive bargaining, and legal defenses against arbitrary dismissals. Although,
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also contains fragile threads that may support them. Lawyers attached or
sympathetic to these initiatives and to insurgent movements have willy-
nilly found themselves uncovering and elaborating these threads,9 or pro-
posing legal reforms which could harbor experiments in democratic con-
trol over capital. 5 These intensely practical efforts and the impediments
they encounter within corporate, government, and union power structures
may provide the context for theory to begin imagining the institutional
forms appropriate to a radical conception of workplace democracy.
V.
To conclude, The Politics of Law reflects CLS's success at reinvigo-
rating the Realist inheritance and making it available to a new generation
of students and activists. As I have noted, in this anthology as in much
CLS scholarship, neorealism is wedded to neo-Marxism. This marriage
has yielded forceful critiques of the ways contemporary legal doctrine in-
sulates exploitation and vast asymmetries of power and wealth, even as it
"protects the rights" of women, blacks, and workers. But, as I have tried
to show, the marriage may also hinder the forging of the normative argu-
ments that are needed to support "critique" and inform action. Moreover,
the critiques themselves generally share two shortcomings. First, they
often speak abstractly of a body of law's ideological effects, but rarely
attend to its actual social and political contexts. And second, while these
essays rightly underscore the limited and mystifying aspects of "liberal
rights talk," virtually all of them leave the latter's positive features
unanalyzed.
I have argued that the hindrance and shortcomings spring largely from
certain schematic strains of neo-Marxism that several of the authors seem
to have adopted. Marxist functionalism tends to assume that those liberal
rights, which in various ways benefit subordinate groups, are essentially
the "system's" or the "class structure's" means to keep those groups quiet
and to keep itself intact. It tends to slight the extent to which these rights
remain contested and, conversely, the extent to which their further devel-
opment may be both a means and a condition for progressive change. The
neo-Marxian notion of law as reification, in turn, holds that the legal
94. See, e.g., Atleson, Work Group Behavior and Wildcat Strikes: The Causes and Functions of
Industrial Civil Disobedience, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 751 (1973); Lynd, Investment Decisions and the
Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396 (1979); Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private
and Public Workplace: Two Doctrines or One?, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. 711 (1977); Lynd, The Right to
Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J.
720 (1975).
95. See, e.g., Ellerman & Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker Cooperative
Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441 (1982-1983); B. BLUESTONE & B.
HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 231-64 (1982).
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order is irremediably bound up with an atomistic, alienating individual-
ism. Legal institutions and processes are a totally estranged, manipulated
embodiment of our collective capacities for self-regulation. The vision of a
radical alternative that arises from this perspective is not a reconstructed
or transformed legal order, but a "withering away" of government and
law and, in their place, a communal world of spontaneous social coopera-
tion that has dispensed with the negative restraints on power of liberal
legalism. Surely, many CLS thinkers are aware of the flaws and dangers
of this vision. Yet, as this book illustrates, the notion of law as reification
continues to brood over their work, counseling a theoretical rejection of
the reconstructive enterprise and a practical despair about the potentials of
legal activism and reform.
I have tried to suggest a number of reasons why this notion is mislead-
ing, both as an account of law as it is and as a view of law's part in
imagining and struggling for a just society. I have also tried to emphasize
a number of points where the authors' considerable insights might support
a different view: that the theoretical case for radical democracy can be
fashioned from premises and norms available within legal discourse; that
legal reform has an essential, if subordinate, part to play in enabling peo-
ple to "see themselves experimenting in democratic forms";9" and, finally,
that the contradictory character of law and legal institutions creates prac-
tical opportunities for contests against the various forms of domination
that CLS assails-contests that are never simply determined and are al-
ways renewed.
96. See L. GOODWYN, THE POPULIST MOMENT, at vii-xxiv (1979).
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